merely economic!) merits of a world in which individuals are the only judges of their own conduct, each choosing what is best and hence personally right for them, from how much to work, to whether or not to have a family, to riding a motorbike without a helmet, and even to using addictive substances.
Michael Novak maintains that democracy has value in much the same way that capitalism does: Both work on the principles of aggregating individual choices. Arguing that the common good is too complex for the government or any other large social institution to grasp, Novak believes that government should not attempt to legislate morality, or what is "good for society." David Hollenbach (1989) summarizes Novak's view of the polity in this way:
Thus the best path toward the common good is not one that proceeds by intending the good society as a whole. Rather, the free market institutions of democratic capitalism create the conditions in which an invisible hand will coordinate the pursuit of individual self-interest. ..in a way that maximizes the social good. (p. 72) And just as there are a series of personal values that sustain a capitalist system-individual virtues such as hard work, thrift, ingenuity, discipline and mutual respect-there are also individual virtues that sustain a democracy, such as toleration of one another and commitment to liberty. These democratic virtues are justified on the grounds of enlightened self-interest, as are the capitalist virtues. In sum, for classical liberals such as Novak and modem liberals like Hook, democracy and the virtues that give life to it have value in a systemic fashion: They promote the private pursuit of fulfIllment for the ultimate repository of "virtue" -the individual. For that reason, a democratic polity may foster democratic virtues even as it avoids social or communitywide virtues.
As I see it, we should not scrap the quest for shared virtues and communitarian values, and the social mechanisms to affirm them, because nothing makes for more government and ultimate coercion (that is, the demon libertarian and laissez faire conservatives properly fear) than the absence of shared morals, backed by strong commitments. Once virtues are eroded, social and civic order must, by default, rest more and more on governmentregulation, controls, and police force. Thus if a community ceases to define drug abuse and alcohol abuse, violence, or greed as unacceptable behavior, it is left solely to the state to protect citizens from these abuses and from one another, an often untenable task. Communities require moral foundations to minimize the role of the government and make those roles it must playpossible and properly circumscribed.
Moreover, a community without value commitments is a jungle of warring or selfish parties, indeed no community at all. Banfield (1958) depicted such a village in his The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. In this village, the poverty and backwardness, he concluded, is largely explained by the villagers' inability to act together for their common good, or for any end transcending the immediate interest of each family (p. 10).
In short, what is clearly needed is a political and moral conception that accommodates the protection of minorities' and individuals' rights without giving up the concept of communitarian virtues.
COMMUNITARIAN VIRTUES AND DEMOCRACY
Communitarians believe that the invisible hand cannot hold a nation together by itself. Moreover, they argue that the libertarian view leads to an insidious complacency about the moral and spiritual health of the republic. Communitarians point out, for instance, that the libertarian faith in one present-day democratic virtue-the right to privacy-provides no legitimate grounds for the prohibition of racial discrimination in private housing, businesses, and clubs. In the communitarian view, communities and the political institutions representing them must make ethical and social issues a common concern, especially given the continuing erosion of central values and social institutions, such as the family, in the postmodern era.
In contrast to the individual-driven faith of libertarians, communitarians argue that persons are social creatures. Personal fulfillment is contingent on social ends and interaction. VIrtue, therefore, is not a private affair; virtue signals appropriate conduct in society. And as virtue is a social affair, it also becomes a political concern because, in the words of Aristotle, "a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for life only" (Aristotle cited in Hollenbach 1989,77) .
Virtue serves two important communitarian purposes. First, as a commonly held moral compass, virtue provides persons and social institutions with direction as they grapple with the political, economic, and social issues of the day. Second, a consensus about virtue also legitimates the polity itself by providing, to paraphrase Cicero, public accord about the nature of justice and the need for the public pursuit of the summum bonum, the common good. Given virtue's central place, communitarians maintain that the polity must make the moral health of the community its concern and take appropriate social, political, and legal steps to support virtues and the social institutions, such as the family, that sustain them.
PROTECTING RIGHTS
American institutions already reflect an ingenious answer to the need to combine consensus making and the moral power of virtues with a democraticpolity.
Instead of allowing unrestrained sway to policies that reflect majorities, we have the well-known "balancing" institutions, whose task is not only to curb one another to limit the general power of each but specifically to protect the rights of individuals and minorities. The same protection is, of course, accorded by the courts, above all the Supreme Court, and the Constitution itself not only as a force that directs law enforcement, regulatory, administrative, and other agencies but as a moral/social normative factor. (William Galston, in an important paper presented at the 1991 meeting of the American Political Science Association, provides an excellent discussion of that point, especially by pointing out the role which "supennajoritarian" requirements built into American democracy play in this country. That is, for a number of significant political measures, simple majorities cannot define what is of merit or virtue while, say, overriding a presidential veto [Galston 1991].) In shoTt, the American political system is far from a simple democratic government if one means by that, as it is all too often put, the rule of the majority, or of the people by the people for the people. Constitutional democracy is, of course, characterized in part by defining areas over which "the people" or the majority may not set policies, whatever its size.
COMMUNITARIAN PLURALISM?
The fall of Rome is usually dle metaphor of choice for harbingers of imminent cultural, social, and political collapse. Communitarians maintain (along with Cicero and Augustine) that the fall of Rome was precipitated by a decline in the sense of public virtue. Modernity, dley add, is destined to go Rome's way if dle libertarian insistence on individual free choice and state "neutrality" when it comes to matters of virtue, like protecting dle family, continues. Theologian David Hollenbach shares many ofdle communitarian fears and draws on one of the greatest "Fall of Rome" dleoris~Augustine -to outline his vision of dle role that virtue should play in a democratic polity. But Hollenbach is also concerned by dle tradition of oppression and discrimination in premodern republics; he thus sees a dlird way between the shoals of libertarianism and audloritarianism.
Augustine's City of God, according to Hollenbach, is the perfect republic. There, citizens are united by a common conception of faith, virtue and the public end. This, however, is just the kind of polity-a community of faith-that makes liberals apoplectic. Augustine, however, disarms this criticism by suggesting that citizens in a republic should not confuse the City of God with the City of Man. Man's highest hopes for fulfillment must lie with heaven: To make an earthly republic the repository of man's fmal hopes for the summum bonum would be idolatrous. Therefore, the civil realm should (and can) only be the realm of the proximate and the possible good.
An earthly approximation of the good, for Hollenbach, may be found when a community defines a plurality of "common goods." This plurality of common ends and virtues, supported by social mores and the force of law, will provide the community with an integmi sense of unity without giving undue emphasis to anyone virtue. He cites Jeffrey Stout to make the case that "no sphere [of historical existence] can rightly occupy the position of be-all-end-all in our lives without throwing the rest out of proper proportion-neither vocation, nor family, nor voluntary association, nor privateprojects, nor politics" (Stout cited in Hollenbach 1989,84) . Rather, every sphere that contributes in a meaningful way to virtue that the community holds high is entitled to social and political support. By rejecting a unitary relationship between religion and politics while encouraging a plurality of common ends, Hollenbach hopes to meet communitarian hopes while allaying libertarian fears.
THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM
Many, like Hollenbach, argue that plunllism sustains the delicate balance between the will of the majority and consensual virtues and the constitutional safeguards. On the community level, it is argued, if there is no one onhodoxy but several competing truths, the fervor of each will be reswained, and people of different moral persuasions and commitments will each find their own set of virtues (various religions or sets of secular moral values). And, regarding the polity, it is often suggested that if various politically active groups advance different sets of values, no one majoritarian position will arise. Policies then would reflect compromises among the various positions advanced.
However, as I see it, pluralism and virtues do not accommodate each other readily because plunllism mitigates commitments and provides no moral foundations for communitywide consensus per se, no overarching values and criteria for worldng up differences other than such mechanical and uncommitting notions as splitting the differences and nose count. On the contrary, when there are a number of value commitments, all of which are considered legitimate, all commitments become relative and weak, and there remain only practical, not principled, grounds for community building, shared values, and policies. In effect, this "de-ideologizing" is precisely what the opponents of virtues and proponents of pluralism seek.
It might be argued that in a society in which little is done on a shared basis, as in a frontier society in which everyone who seeks change can go and find their ways in unsettled territories, there is 00 need for community values, consensus, and virtues. There can be, though, little doubt that for a society like contemporary America that has a long list of matters to which it must attend collectively, such as defense, public safety (crime), the environment, and global competitiveness, a society that has lost the basic moral/social foundations of a shared social and civic order, pluralism per se will not suffice.
PLURALISM WITHIN UNITY: VIRTU~ WITH RIGHTS
As Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) writes, "The stability of any given democracy depends. ..upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system" (p. 77). Both the effectivess and legitimacy of a democratic society depend on a measure of unity. Yet many democratic societies, especially the United States, confront the fact of ethnic, religious, and social pluralism. How can we then sustain an effective and legitimate republic?
An answer is to be found in the concept of pluralism within unity. It recognizes that diversity can not be unlimited and that some ultimate values must be shared for the diversity to be contained. These provide the foundations for shared policies and criteria for settling conflicting claims. These virtues include, fIrSt of all, a set of ultimate values such as compassion for the poor, concern for the viability of the family, and concern for the environment (The fact that these values are fuzzy at the edges is not necessarily detrimental, because as long as the basic commitments stand, societies have various ways to wOtX out the specific meanings of such values; this ceases to be the case when the values are directly challenged or their basic meaning is contested.) Second, the shared values or virtues are to include a legitimation of democracy and tolerance of diversity within the shared framewotX and of individual standings and hence certain basic rights (Langan 1990 ). This point should be stressed: Individual rights do not rest on individuals, somehow born or endowed with them, but on a community-shared morality that legitimates and otherwise sustains them. In the polity, community values and virtues take the form of recognizing a public interest or interests above and Etliooi I VIR11JES IN PLURAUSllC DEMOCRACY 537 beyond the plurality of special ones. Both of these points deserve some elaboration. The fIrst issue is frequently raised in discussions of bicultural education. Pluralists sttess the merits of allowing, even encouraging, people of different ethnic, cultural, and racial backgrounds, especially immigrants, not only to learn in their language and tradition, say Spanish, rather than re forced to shift right away and learn all subjects in English, but also to maintain separate traditions and learning (e.g., Black English) and to maintain parallel tracks of values and commiunents, without a commiunent to a shared, overarching educational program. Thus in Miami, a Cuban American can complete 12 years of school in a Spanish program without ever mingling with other Americans or learning about American core values, at least not without a strong Hispanic orientation. These educational programs are compatible with the concept of a "rainbow" society, in which a variety of equally legitimate "colors," with different traditions and virtues are to coexist next to one another.
I suggest that such unbounded pluralism, one that cuts into ultimate values and shared virtues, is not compatible with maintaining a moral, social and civic order, with providing a community with a set of criteria to sort out differences and form a consensus, and hence incompatible with the democratic process. Pluralism is compatible with community and virtue as long as it is limited to maintain subtraditions, as long as they all recognize areas of communalities that frame the community as well as mutual tolerance and respect of the various plural traditions. Thus no sociopolitical difficulties arise if various groups adhere to different folk dances, songs, food tastes, religious reliefs, and social manners (say at weddings and funerals). No melting pot is needed here. However, when these groups cease to share a commiunent to one community, society, or nation, the unity that needs to contain pluralism is strained.
For example, in a debate with a representative of a major Hispanic group on William F. Buckley, Jr.'s show "Firing Line," I suggested that while it is fme for various ethnic groups in the United States to maintain their languages as a second language (from Hebrew to Japanese), they all need to learn English. The Hispanic representative argued that we all live in a Hispanic hemisphere and hence we should all fIrSt learn Spanish; then those that wish may learn English on the side. This notion cuts into the bonds of unity. (Language often has this power-it still divides Belgium and Canada, and whereas the Swiss make do with several, they are only following a thousand years of warfare among the various language-loyal cantons.)
In the same vein, later in the same debate on "Firing Line," the represen-tative of the Hi~ic group declared that should the United States engage inwar in Latin America. say Nicaragua (this program took place before the U.S. intervention in Panama), Hi~ic Americans ought to refuse to fight. Similarly, some Black Americans opposed participating in the war in the Persian Gulf because they saw it as a Black-against-Blackconfrontation. Ata Harlemrally, the Reverend AI Sharpton proclaimed, "We will not fight our brothers in the Middle East" (The New Yorker, 18 March 1991) .
Typically, communities cannot tolerate pluralism on dIese issues when sizable groups are involved (dIey can and do tolerate a few conscientious objectors). Ravitch (1991) 
put it well:
If there is no overall community, if all we have is a motley collection of racial and etlmic cultures, there will be no sense of the common good. Each group will fight for its own particular interests, and we could easily disintegrate as a nation, becoming instead embroiled in the kinds of etlmic conflicts that often dominate the foreign news each night. (p. 36) There is no clear established list of what belongs in dIe share frame versus in which areas pluralism is welcome or essential. Indeed, dIe specific list may differ from one community to another (e.g., many European countries include Good Samaritan laws, we do not [Glendon 1990/91, 10] ) as long as the realm of virtues is sufficiently powerful to provide a containing capsule to dIe centrifugal forces of dIe various plural parts. A shared set of basic moral values, a language, some shared national symbols and values, a commitment of mutual tolerance, a commitment to democracy as a "good" and not merely as a procedural device, seem to be essential and found in most if not all functioning democracies. These shared values are noticeably absent in oilier societies as different as dIe USSR is from Nigeria. The jury is out about India, where dIe weak set of shared virtues is reflected in massive intergroup violence and frequent violations of individual rights.
In dIe polity, dIe same issue arises widI reference to dIe concept of the public interest. Unbounded pluralists have argued that dIere is no need for a concept of public interest and that none is possible (Truman 1964, SO) . Politics, dIey argue, is an extension to society from a market concept, as special interest groups vie widI one anodIer over dIe direction of public policies (Key 1958, 166) . The state is merely a point dIat reflects dIe results of dIe relative power of dIe various special inputs (MilbradI 1963, 345) . While it is true dIat the notion of public interest is often raised, unbounded pluralists argue dIat dIese statements are mere ideological ones dIat each special interest group moudIs to advance its particular cause (Horowitz 1979, 4) ; that public interest cannot be even defined.
In contrast, I argue that a concept of public interest, recognizing that some virtues rest in the commons, is needed to correct and balaoce the political centrifugal forces, as it is necessary in the community to balance the moral/ social effects of plumlism there (Etzioni 1984) . Moreover, one can determine when a group advances the needs of its members and when it serves the public at large according to who benefits from the action. Thus the Sierra Club, a leading environmentalist group, on the basis of its stated goals, is clearly a public interest group. On the other hand, if it really does dedicate itself, as Tucker (1982) argues, to gaining privileges for its u~r-middle-class members, such as untrammeled mountains to ski on, it clearly is a special interest group.
In conclusion, communitarian virtues-virtues shared and underwritten by a community-are not incompatible with true democracy. Rights can be protected if communitarian virtues include tolerance for one another and, above all, a clear demarcation of the areas that deservedly lie in the publicrealm and those that ought to be left to individual choice and subgrouppreference Moreover, various political mechanisms, especially the Consti-tution, serve to sustain the creative tension between spheres of commonalityand social virtues and spheres of individuality and personal virtues.
